Turner and Stets (2006) write that
shame and guilt can set into motion processes that again arouse other emotions
like anger, fear, disgust, and hatred (Lewis 1991; Scheff 1990; Turner 2002).
They conclude that guilt is probably a typical moral emotion because it is
clearly related to the action of violating cultural codes, while shame is a
less typical moral emotion because it comes when a person has behaved
incompetently (not necessarily a wrong doing) or when one senses a devaluation
of one self from other (Turner, 2002). Combined with the figure 1, this would
mean that guilt is a strong moral emotion because intensity as its evaluative
content is very high and often connected with values the society is likely to
hold. The respect for private property is highly values in our western society.
Stealing another persons property is therefore an action with a high evaluative
content, which makes the guilt connected to this action a strong moral emotion.
Should one not live up to the expectations of ones spouse, the situational
norms in ones marriage would be broken, and one could feel embarrassed or
shameful. This shows that shame has less intensity as a moral emotion because
of its evaluative content.
But what is morality? Turner and
Stets (2006) say that from a sociological point of view “morality ultimately
revolves around evaluating cultural codes that specify what is right or wrong,
good or bad, acceptable or unacceptable” (p. 544). Figure 1 shows different
moral codes at the level of society where values are important; at the level of
broad institutional domains (family, economy, education, science and so forth)
where ideologies about what is right, proper, and appropriate are important for
individuals; at the level of specific institutions, for example a worker in the
factory or a student at school, have expectations to live up to; and finally
there are face-to-face interaction where norms say something about respectful
conduct and are therefore moral.
It is common for people to feel
shame when they violate an expectation in a face-to-face interaction. The shame
felt can have different intensity, from embarrassment to humiliation, but it is
shame they feel and not necessarily guilt. They have not lived up to the
expectations they have to themselves or that they believe others have to them
in a specific situation, and that is why the feel shame. It does not mean that
they have done something wrong which induces guilt. But the less situational
and the more ideological the norm becomes, the more will guilt also dominate
the person involved. People can feel both shame and guilt when an institutional
norm or society value is broken, for example for scientists to lie and build
their research on falsified data; or for parents to abuse or neglect their
children.
Shame, like other moral emotions,
connects a person to social structure and culture through self-awareness. This
self-awareness consists of a relation where the self relates itself to itself,
or as the philosopher Søren Kierkegaard puts it
“But what is the self? The self is a
relation that relates itself to itself or is the relation’s relating itself to
itself in the relation; the self is not the relation but is the relation’s
relating itself to itself” (Sickness unto
Death, 1849/1980, p. 13).
Turner and Stets (2006) use a more sociological discription:
“An individual’s
transsituational self-conception and more situational identity are both
cognitive and emotional constructs.
They involve conceptions of who a person is, how others should respond to self,
and valenced emotions about the characteristics of self in several or
particular parts” (p. 548).
But put together, the philosophical and the sociological citations
describe the self as consisting of layers upon layers of constructs,
conceptions and characteristics, which all relate to each other in a very
complex relationship. The self is both a process and a relation, both with
itself and with others. Because the self is powered with emotions, it can
become a moral self. These can be seen in individuals that give the impression
of having the moral identity of being caring, and that they say that they feel
both shame and guilt when they feel that they do not help others in the way
should or could have. Shame can be especially painful because the self is so
much involved.
Inducing more shame, as John
Baithwaite (1989) recommends as a response to criminal behavior instead of
imprisonment, in order to build up their conscience, is at its best only a
solution for the shameless, those that do wrong without regret. But I agree
with Martha C. Nussbaum (2004), that this kind of shaming, which is becoming
more and more usual, is not the way to go. She gives five arguments for this.
First, shaming would be in violation with the principle of dignity, of the
society’s responsibility to give all citizens a social basis for self-respect.
Secondly, all such forms for response are just the same as stoning people or
using the pillory. They represent a primitive form for reaction that is not worthy
of a modern civilized society. Thirdly, they are not reliable. It is very much
possible that this form for reaction will strike the wrong person, or be too
harsh or to mild in relation to the misdoing. Forth, shaming does not function
as a judicial punishment, that one is finished with shame when shaming is over.
The humiliation one is given through shaming continues and the community will
push the wrong doer even further away than before. An lastly, one has the
problem of “net-widening”. When a reform is introduced as an alternative to
imprisonment for short sentences, there will always be a resistance to include
people who one believes should have gone to prison. So one ends up shaming
people who otherwise would not have gone to prison but received probation. The
result being a unplanned widening of shaming without control from the judicial
system.
Both shame and guilt when people recognize
that a cultural code has been broken or that there has been a failure to live
up to these. Despite the similarities between shame and guilt, there are some
differences between them that are substantial. Lewis (1971) emphasized that
shame included the whole self. Shame makes people feel small and worthless,
both by self-evaluation and by looking at oneself in the eyes of others. One
tries desperately to hide, escape, or to strike back. Shame damages the self
and is so painful that defence mechanisms try to protect the self. This leads
often to anger and violence pointed toward others, giving a sense of control
(Lewis, 1971; Retzinger, 1991; Scheff and Retzinger, 1991). My data will show
that this anger and violence is also pointed towards oneself, giving a sense of
control in the same way as if it was pointed towards others. The consequence of
this is a highly activated defence mechanisms and therefore less attunement to
others. Turner and Stets (2005) have included a model worked out by Scheff
which shows the development of reactions when the shame is denied and
repressed, leading to hostility, contra shame that is openly spoken of through
a positive self evaluation, leading to mutual respect and social solidarity
(Figure 2).
Figure 2: Scheff’s model of attunement and social solidarity (Turner and
Stets, 2005, p.156) supplemented with reflections own reflections concerning
hostility (cursive writing).
Many of my informants told about
one or more of these two forms of hostility, clearly related to shame.
Hostility towards others can be direct aggression and violence, and also new
sexual transgressions. Hostility towards one self can be self- injury,
self-starvation, suicide attempt, an so forth. Both forms always gave my
informants a short lived relief of inner pain, before being tormented by guilt.
This leads to a negative spiral with new negative- self-evaluation, new hiding
and denial of shame and new hostility, and this ca go on for years on end.
Kaare T. Pettersen
References
Braithwaite, John, 1989. Crime, Shame and Reintegration. Cambridge: Cambridge
University
Press.
Kierkegaard, Søren,
[1849] 1980. The Sickness unto Death. A
Christian Psychological
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Awakening. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
(Translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong).
Lewis, Helen Block., 1971. Shame and Guilt in Neurosis. New York:
International
Universities Press.
Nussbaum, Martha C., 2004. Hiding
from Humanity. Disgust, Shame and the Law. Princeton:
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Retzinger, Suzanne M., 1991. Violent
Emotions. Shame and Rage in Marital Quarrels.
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Scheff, Thomas J., 1990. Socialization of Emotion: Pride and Shame as
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State University
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Turner (eds.), Handbook of the Sociology of Emotions. Springer.
Turner, Jonathan H., 2002. Face-to-Face:
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Standford: Standford
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